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THE INTERNATIONAL SILVER PLATTER AND THE "SHOCKS THE
CONSCIENCE" TEST: U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT
OVERSEAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the federal Constitution protects the people
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" conducted by the govern-
ment.I Although the Constitution provides no remedy for fourth amend-
ment violations, the Supreme Court, in Weeks v. United States,2
announced the fourth amendment exclusionary rule3 as the judicial rem-
edy' for such violations by law enforcement agents.5 The primary pur-
l. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
Although the amendment by its terms applies only to the federal government, the United States
Supreme Court has incorporated the fourth amendment guarantee into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, thus proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures by the states as well.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. There are five primary exclusionary rules in Supreme Court case law. The following are
generally inadmissible: (1) evidence or testimony obtained in violation of the fourth amendment,
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); (2) testimony obtained in violation of the fifth amend-
ment or the Miranda doctrine, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); (3) evidence obtained in
violation of the sixth amendment, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); (4) evidence se-
cured by methods "shocking the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); and (5)
evidence secured in violation of the federal anti-wiretap statute, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S.
379 (1937). See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1958).
4. The Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy not
required by the Constitution. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Some scholars
maintain that the exclusionary rule is implicitly required by the fourth amendment. For a discussion
of the competing views see P. POLYVIOU, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON
LAW ch. 7, § (b)(iv) (1982).
This Note focuses only on the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, as distinguished from the fifth
amendment and sixth amendment exclusionary rules.
5. The Court has held that the exclusionary rule, like the fourth amendment, applies to the
states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961) (evidence unlawfully seized by states is inadmissi-
ble in state courts); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960) (evidence unlawfully seized
by states is inadmissible in federal courts).
Although the fourth amendment now applies to the states, it does not proscribe so-called private
searches, searches conducted by private individuals not acting on behalf of the government or a
government official. See, eg., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474 (1921) (because the fourth
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pose of the rule is to deter fourth amendment violations 6 by barring the
prosecution and law enforcement officials 7 from using unlawfully seized
evidence8 against the defendant.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment to require
that law enforcement agents obtain a warrant, issued by "a neutral and
detached magistrate,"9 before conducting a search or seizure."° The
Court's overriding concern is that officers make arrests and conduct
searches only upon probable cause, and a warrant represents an in-
dependent determination that probable cause exists." Warrantless
amendment is a limitation only upon government conduct, evidence secured in private searches
should not be excluded from a criminal trial).
6. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734-37 (1980); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
446 (1976).
7. This Note will focus on the defensive use of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule by
defendants in criminal and quasi-criminal cases and not on the offensive use of the fourth amend-
ment in civil actions against the United States or state governments.
8. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine extends the reach of the exclusionary rule by
forbidding the use of any evidence uncovered by government investigators as the result of a clue
obtained in an illegal search or seizure. See Nardone v. United States, 308 US. 338, 340-41 (1939)
(evidence which is "fruit of the poisonous tree" is inadmissible); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (evidence procured in an unlawful manner may not only "not be
used before the Court but ... it shall not be used at all"). There are exceptions to the doctrine,
however. For instance, when, by reason of police misconduct, the evidence is "tainted," it may
nevertheless be admissible if "the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
... means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (defendant's confession admissible because it was voluntarily given
after defendant had been released from an illegal arrest). Further, a search conducted pursuant to a
facially valid, magistrate-issued search warrant is valid if the executing officer conducted the search
in good faith reliance on the warrant. This is so even if the warrant is later determined to be unsup-
ported by probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
9. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (arrest warrant to be issued by a
neutral and detached magistrate). Although strictly speaking only unreasonable searches and
seizures are prohibited by the fourth amendment, "ft]he United States Supreme Court has expressed
a strong preference for the making of searches and seizures pursuant to search warrant." W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1 (1987).
10. An arrest is a seizure of the person. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976).
11. There are several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Circumstances under which a
warrant is not required include: (1) searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); (2) searches of vehicles, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (3) searches required
by exigent circumstances, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); (4) seizure of items in "plain
view," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); (5) public arrests for felonies, United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); (6) consent searches, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); and (7) inventory searches, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983). See generally P.
PoLyviou, supra note 4, at 152-205.
Moreover, under the long-standing Ker-Frisbie doctrine, neither an illegal arrest nor unlawful
methods of bringing a suspect into the United States divest a court of its otherwise proper jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. Due process has been satisfied when the defendant is apprised of the
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searches or seizures are not, however, per se invalid, and the Court has
established various exceptions. 12
The Bill of Rights protects U.S. citizens against official U.S. action
both at home and abroad." Although the fourth amendment protects
U.S. citizens against unreasonable searches conducted by U.S. law en-
forcement officers, the fourth amendment does not apply to searches con-
ducted exclusively by foreign governments. Further, evidence seized by
foreign governments and subsequently given to U.S. law enforcement of-
ficials on a "silver platter" is admissible in U.S. courts." However, if
U.S. agents abroad and a foreign government conduct a search or seizure
as part of a "joint venture," the investigation must comply with the
fourth amendment or any evidence seized will be subject to the exclu-
sionary rule. 5 How much U.S. participation is permissible before the
charges against him and is given a fair trial. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436 (1886). The Court has declined to retreat from that doctrine. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Men-
doza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975).
The Second Circuit has nevertheless held that it may rely on its supervisory power to prevent the
district courts within the circuit from exercising jurisdiction over illegally arrested defendants. Tos-
canino v. United States, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974) (en bane).
One year later the Second Circuit explained that Toscanino was not a departure from the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, but rather an exception to it. In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975), the court held that the Toscanino rule applies only to
.conduct of the most outrageous and reprehensible kind." For a discussion of the Ker-Frisbee doc-
trine and the legal limitations on the authority of U.S. officers to engage in international kidnapping
see W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 1.9(b) at 227; Note, Federally Sponsored International Kidnapping:
An Acceptable Alternative to Extradition?, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 1205 (1986).
Although an illegal arrest does not affect jurisdiction, an illegal arrest may have other conse-
quences. For instance evidence or confessions which are the "fruit" of an illegal arrest are inadmissi-
ble unless the taint created by the illegal arrest is subsequently attenuated. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See supra note 8.
12. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
13. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957). "When the Government reaches out to punish a
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide
to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land." Id. Accord Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640-44 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Air Force could not
discharge civilian employee on the basis of evidence seized in Japan by Air Force officials in violation
of the fourth amendment.).
14. "[S]ince United States courts cannot be expected to police law enforcement practices
around the world, let alone to conform such practices to fourth amendment standards by means of
deterrence, the exclusionary rule does not normally apply to foreign searches conducted by foreign
officials." United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The exclusionary rule
does not apply even when a U.S. citizen is the subject of the questionable foreign search. Id. See also
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (1976) ("[i]t is well established ... that the exclusionary
rule . . is not applicable where ... a foreign government commits the offending act").
15. See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Fourth amendment
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operation becomes a "joint venture" triggering the fourth amendment
remains unclear.
This Note addresses the constitutional limitations federal courts have
placed upon U.S. law enforcement agents conducting investigations
abroad." Part II briefly examines the origin and purpose of the "silver
platter" doctrine. It then synthesizes from the "international silver plat-
ter" cases a general rule delineating the extent of allowable U.S. partici-
pation in foreign investigations. Part II also examines what the fourth
amendment, once triggered, requires of U.S. agents abroad. Finally, Part
III focuses on the rationale and validity of the courts' frequent assertions
that they may exercise their supervisory power to exclude evidence seized
by foreign governments if the circumstances surrounding that seizure
"shock the judicial conscience." This Note concludes that the courts
lack authority to exclude evidence seized by a foreign government under
circumstances which "shock the judicial conscience."17 However, the
courts should require compliance with the fourth amendment in any case
involving more than minimal U.S. participation."8
could apply to raids by foreign officials only if federal agents so substantially participated in the raids
so as to convert them into a joint venture between the United States and the foreign officials."), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969). See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
16. Several related topics are beyond the scope of this Note. For example, fourth amendment
analysis with respect to searches on the high seas differs from traditional fourth amendment analysis
because the mobility and location of vessels present exigent circumstances justifying warrantless
searches. See United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486,494 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. William,
617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc). For a discussion of high seas fourth amendment search and seizure law see Saltzburg, The
Reach of the Bill ofights Beyond the Terra Firma of the United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L. L. 741, 747-
60 (1980); CARMICHAEL, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51 (1977);
Note, High on the Seasr Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea,
93 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1980).
Similarly, this Note does not address the effect of international treaties upon the admissibility of
evidence procured in foreign searches or seizures.
Finally, this Note does not address the issue of what protection aliens abroad have against illegal
searches and seizures conducted by U.S. officials. For two differing views on this issue compare
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1218-24 (9th Cir. 1988) (fourth amendment
protect aliens abroad from illegal U.S. searches and seizures) with id. at 1230-37 (Wallace J., dissent-
ing) (aliens abroad are not part of the class "the people" to whom the fourth amendment applies).
See also United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275, 280 (2d Cir.) (fourth amendment applies in
criminal trials of "aliens who are the victims of unconstitutional action abroad"), rehg denied, 504
F.2d 1380 (1974) (en bane). The Supreme Court has not resolved this issue.
17. The courts have asserted repeatedly supervisory power. No court, however, has suppressed
evidence on that basis. See infra notes 142-165 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL "SILVER PLATTER" DOCTRINE
A. Origin
Cases involving cooperation between federal agents and state officials
provided the analytical framework that courts have applied to searches
conducted by foreign governments with the participation of U.S.
agents.19 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Elkins v. United
States,20 evidence seized by state officials during searches which offended
fourth amendment standards was admissible in federal courts, provided
that the search and seizure met two requirements. First, the federal gov-
ernment must not have participated in the search.2" Second, the state
officer must have seized the evidence for a state purpose, not on behalf of
the federal government.22 The federal use of evidence seized by state
officers was permitted under the silver platter doctrine. Justice Frank-
furter clearly enunciated the doctrine:
The crux of the ... doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if
he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured
by state authorities is turned over to federal authorities on a silver plat-
ter .... So long as he was in it before the object of the search was com-
pletely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in it.23
The Elkins Court, however, rejected the silver platter doctrine, holding
state-seized evidence handed to federal agents must be obtained through
procedures that comply with the fourth amendment.24 Thus, before the
courts had formulated any tests for determining what federal conduct
constitutes "having a hand in" a state search, Elkins rendered the issue
moot. The issue, however, resurfaced in the Court's earliest attempts to
apply the doctrine in foreign government search cases.
19. See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 382 U.S. 963
(1969). See also Comment, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule In Federal Court To Evidence
Seized and Confessions Obtained in Foreign Countries, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 495, 503-05
(1977) (noting how the Stonehill majority derived its rule by analogy to state seized evidence cases).
But see Saltzburg, supra note 16, at 768 (arguing that the state "silver platter cases are of little help
in the international context because of the unique problems of international law enforcement").
20. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
21. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 318 (1927).
22. Id.
23. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949).
24. 364 U.S. at 222. Later, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court extended the
application of the exclusionary rule to the states, requiring state courts to exclude state-seized evi-
dence not procured in compliance with the fourth amendment.
1989]
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B. Application
Under the fourth amendment, evidence seized from U.S. citizens by
U.S. law enforcement officers, even if seized in a foreign country, is inad-
missible in U.S. courts unless the search and seizure comply with the
fourth amendment.25 Conversely, evidence that is the product of a
search conducted exclusively by a foreign government is admissible in
U.S. courts, even when the search does not meet fourth amendment stan-
dards.26 The rationale for this international silver platter doctrine is that
U.S. courts can do little, if anything, to deter unreasonable searches by
foreign governments.2 7 The law regarding foreign searches involving
U.S. agents is, however, not so well defined because of the recurring, yet
unresolved, question: how much U.S. involvement is necessary to trigger
the fourth amendment?
Generally, federal courts of appeals require U.S. involvement 28 either
to be "substantial" or to reach the level of "joint venture" to implicate
the fourth amendment.29 At least one circuit appears to hold that U.S.
presence and cooperation is insufficient to trigger the fourth amend-
ment.3" In addition, one circuit has refused to adopt either standard in
determining what level of U.S. participation triggers fourth amendment
protection. 31 Some circuits that appear to apply a joint venture approach
have refrained from using the phrase "joint venture."32 Others openly
25. See supra note 9-10 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
27. United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
28. A court's decision to admit illegally seized evidence does not itself constitute impermissible
participation. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (decisions to admit illegally
seized evidence do not "constitute distinct violations of ... Fourth Amendment rights"). See also
LAFAVE, supra note 9, at § 1.8(f), (g).
29. Apparently, the courts regard the "joint venture" to be a stricter standard. However, as
this Note argues, the difference in the standards is more apparent than real. See infra notes 119-129
and accompanying text. See also Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The
Fourth Amendment could apply to raids by foreign officials only if Federal agents so substantially
participated in the raids so as to convert them into joint ventures."), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960
(1969).
30. Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 963 (1965). In
Birdsell, the court held the fourth amendment inapplicable "even though American officials were
present and cooperated in some degree in the foreign search." Id at 782-83.
31. United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 270 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977). For a discussion of Marzano see infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
32. United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("participated in some signif-
icant way"; cites Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), with approval); United
States v. Marzano, 537 U.S. 257, 270 (7th Cir. 1976) (participation was "too insignificant"), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
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use the term."3 Notwithstanding the circuits' failure to apply a uniform
test or uniform terminology, the results in almost all of the reported cases
have been the same. The circuits are reluctant to exclude the evidence
regardless of the level of U.S. involvement.3 4 Thus any differences
among the circuits are more apparent than actual.
In one of the earliest cases, Birdsell v. United States, 5 the Fifth Circuit
held the fourth amendment inapplicable to a foreign government in its
own land, "even though American officials were present and cooperated
in some degree."3 6 In Birdsell, a Texas deputy sheriff traveling in Mexico
acted as an interpreter for Mexican police who were questioning two U.S.
citizens suspected of transporting stolen cars. 7 Mexican authorities sub-
sequently summoned an FBI agent to Mexico where he participated with
Mexican police in a search of the suspects' car which yielded incriminat-
ing evidence.3 8
Despite the court's conclusion that the U.S. law enforcement officials
were merely "present and cooperating" in the Mexican search, the
court's version of the facts clearly reveals that the level of U.S. involve-
ment was considerably more significant, at least after the arrival of the
FBI agent.3 9 While the fruits of the first phase, when the deputy sheriff
merely interpreted for Mexican police, were clearly admissible in U.S.
courts, the question of the admissibility of the evidence seized in the sec-
ond phase, where the FBI agent assisted in a search of the defendants'
car, is more complex. U.S. and Mexican officials discovered evidence
during a joint, warrantless search. If the fourth amendment circum-
scribes U.S. officers' conduct abroad, then U.S. officers should have prob-
33. See United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 480 U.S.
919 (1987); United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
827 (1986); United States v. Hensel. 699 F.2d 18, 25 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
34. See infra notes 35-125 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
854 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) (excluded evidence after finding a "joint venture"). In the context of
the fifth amendment the Tenth Circuit suggested if the foreign officials have an independent interest
in conducting the investigation, the level of U.S. participation is irrelevant. The Tenth Circuit de-
scribed the "joint venture" standard as indefinite, vague and unreliable. United States v. Mundt, 508
F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975). See also Saltzburg, supra note 16, at
762-64.
35. 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
36. Id. at 782.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 782-83.
39. Id. Only the first phase of the search, in which the Texas deputy sheriff merely served as an
interpreter, was purely Mexican. When the FBI agent arrived, he actually "inspected [the cars] with
the Mexican police." Id.
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able cause before engaging in a joint search with foreign governments. In
any event, the practical result of Birdsell was that a joint U.S.-Mexican
search did not trigger the fourth amendment constraints.
Three years later in Stonehill v. United States,' the Ninth Circuit ar-
ticulated the "joint venture" standard for application of the fourth
amendment. The Court defined "joint venture" as one in which
"[federal agents so substantially participated in the raids so as to convert
them into joint ventures between the United States and the foreign
officials.41
In Stonehill, IRS agents helped the Philippine National Bureau of In-
vestigation (N.B.I.) to plan and conduct raids of two U.S. taxpayers'
business premises in the Philippines.42 The IRS agents were present
while the N.B.I. searched the taxpayers' business files and told N.B.I.
agents which records were "most significant from an accounting point of
view."'43 Based on these facts, the court held that U.S. officials did not
participate in the foreign search and they did obtain the evidence
lawfully.4
Just as in Birdsell, the Stonehill court's recitation of the facts demon-
strates substantial U.S. participation and undermines its conclusion that
the U.S. involvement in the search did not constitute a joint venture.45
First, the majority found that the Philippine government seized the evi-
dence for its own use and not for use in a U.S. prosecution.46 However,
the fact that the N.B.I. seized the evidence under IRS supervision and
that the evidence was likely to be probative of the defendants' compliance
with the Internal Revenue Code suggests that the Philippine seizure was
not solely for Philippine purposes.47
40. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cer denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
41. Id. at 743.
42. Id. at 750 (Browning, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 742.
44. Id. at 746. The court listed six factors that led to its conclusion. First, the raids were
instigated and planned by Philippine agents. Second, all U.S. activity occurred prior to or after the
raids. Third, only after the raids were U.S. agents allowed to copy documents in which they were
interested in. Fourth, there was no evidence U.S. agents were attempting to "short circuit" the
fourth amendment rights of the taxpayers. Fifth, U.S. agents objected to the raids. Finally, when
U.S. agents made information about the defendants available to the Philippine government they were
not requesting that any action be taken. Id. at 746.
45. Id. at 746.
46. Id. The Philippine government hoped to deport Stonehill and Brooks as "undesirable
aliens." Id. at 741.
47. Id.
[Vol. 67:489
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Second, the court found that all U.S. participation had occurred either
before the raids began or after they finished.48 The court's statement of
the facts, however, indicates that the IRS agents were on the premises
during the raid, instructing the N.B.I. agents as to what they should
seize.4 9 As the dissent pointed out, the majority reached a result that
contradicts its own version of the facts by using the word raids in a
"highly restricted sense."5
Third, the majority found no evidence that the "agents were attempt-
ing to short circuit the Fourth Amendment."5 Indeed, the court found
that since the U.S. agents objected to the raids 2 and had at no time
requested any Philippine action, there was no constitutionally defective
conduct on the part of the IRS agents.53 Had the U.S. agents purpose-
fully attempted to circumvent the fourth amendment, the court would
have had no other alternative but to conclude that the agents had partici-
pated so substantially as to convert the operation into a "joint venture."
The court's analysis is flawed, however, because the agents, while not
intending to circumvent the fourth amendment, nevertheless did violate
it. That the agents were not attempting to circumvent the Constitution is
irrelevant to whether enough U.S. participation existed to convert the
search into a joint U.S.-Philippine venture. 54
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Marzano,55 declined to adopt
either the Birdsell or the Stonehill standards,56 yet reached the same re-
sult: mere U.S. involvement in a foreign search is not enough to impli-
cate the fourth amendment.
In Marzano, the Court held that the "[m]ere presence of federal of-
ficers [during a foreign investigation and search] is not sufficient to make
the officers participants." 57 Two FBI agents requested and received the
assistance of the Grand Cayman government in a search for two bank
48, Id. at 746.
49. Id. at 742.
50. Id. at 751 (Browning, J., dissenting). The majority concluded that the raids were already
complete when the IRS was finally allowed to copy the records. Id. at 746.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 743. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
55. 537 F.2d 257, 270 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
56. Id. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit Birdsell test, unlike the Stonehill test, purport-
edly requires application of the fourth amendment even before U.S. participation in a foreign search
reaches the level of a "joint venture."
57. Id.
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robbery suspects." A Grand Cayman policeman, accompanied by an
FBI agent, located the suspects and arrested them after they refused to
give him their names and addresses.5 9 After taking the suspects into cus-
tody, the policeman, still accompanied by the FBI agent, took the sus-
pects to the police station where another Grand Cayman officer searched
the suspects and seized evidence from them.' Both FBI agents were
present during the search and seizure.61 In addition, they helped inspect
and inventory the seized articles.62 The next morning, when the suspects
were put on a plane bound for Miami, Grand Cayman police gave the
seized evidence to the FBI agents who took the same flight.63 Upon their
arrival in Miami, the FBI agents arrested the suspects. 64
The Seventh Circuit's holding is illogical for several reasons. First, the
court found the Grand Cayman police arrested the suspects for a viola-
tion of Cayman law which apparently requires a person to identify him-
self upon the request of a Grand Cayman policeman.6" However, but for
the FBI's instigation,66 the Grand Cayman police would not have asked
the defendants for their names and addresses, the defendants would not
have had to divulge the information, and the defendants would never
have been arrested or searched for violation of Grand Cayman law.67
The Grand Cayman officers' primary intention, not their secondary in-
tention as the court labels it,68 was to help the U.S. government appre-
hend two burglary suspects. Second, the Grand Cayman police never
formally charged the defendants with a violation of Grand Cayman
law.69 Finally, the FBI received all of the evidence seized by the Grand
Cayman police.7'
The few cases in which the courts have found substantial participation
58. Id.
59. Id. at 277 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 270, 278.
64. Id. at 279.
65. Id. at 271.
66. Apparently, the FBI provided information about the defendants to the Grand Cayman po-
lice. In addition, the FBI provided photographs of the defendants. Id. at 280 (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 271.
69. Id. at 277-78 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 277 n.2 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
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to trigger fourth amendment protection are of little help in determining
what degree of U.S. involvement in foreign searches makes foreign-seized
evidence inadmissible. For example, in United States v. IHensel,7 the
First Circuit found a "joint venture" between the United States and Can-
ada when the U.S. Coast Guard attempted to intercept a boat which it
suspected of drug smuggling.72 In Hensel, the Coast Guard requested
Canadian assistance when the U.S. Coast Guard was unable to intercept
the boat before it escaped into Canadian waters.73 The U.S. Coast Guard
provided machine gun cover while three armed Canadian agents boarded
and searched the boat. The agents found nearly nineteen tons of mari-
juana.74 Without determining whether this series of events constituted a
U.S.-Canadian joint venture, the First Circuit simply upheld the district
court's conclusion that the operation was a joint venture because that
conclusion was not clearly erroneous.75 Even though the court found
that a joint venture existed, it nevertheless held that the evidence was
admissible on other grounds.7 6
Recently, the Ninth Circuit found joint ventures in United States v.
Peterson 77 and in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.78 In Peterson, the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) alerted the Philippine Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) that a suspected drug smuggling boat was en
route to the Philippines. 79 The defendants moved to suppress evidence
seized in two search incidents. In the first incident, NARCOM taped
and the DEA translated radio transmissions between the boat and an
apartment in the Philippines.'0 In the second incident, NARCOM ad-
ministered a wiretap of the phone conversations from the apartment and
71. 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
72. Id. at 21-22, 25. As noted above, there is a legal distinction between fourth amendment
requirements on the high seas and those in other international contexts. See supra note 16.
73. The Canadian government sent a Canadian Coast Guard plane to assist the U.S. govern-
ment. The U.S. Coast Guard informed Canada that U.S. officers could not board the boat without
the permission of the State Department which would take 24 to 48 hours to obtain. Id. at 21-22.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 25.
76. Id. at 26. The court justified the search as a search conducted on the high seas. A warrant-
less search on the high seas is valid if the search is based on probable cause. Thus, the court found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contraband into evidence. Id. See
supra note 16.
77. 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987).
78. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
79. 812 F.2d at 488.
80. Id.
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provided the DEA with tapes of those calls."1 The Coast Guard thereaf-
ter intercepted the boat and confiscated marijuana it found on board. 2
In concluding that the U.S. and Philippine governments participated
in a joint venture, the court first noted that a DEA agent in his testimony
at trial described the operation as a "joint investigation." 3 Furthermore,
the court found that the DEA "assumed a substantial role in the case" 4
and that its role was not "subordinate to the role of Philippine authori-
ties."85 The court nevertheless held the evidence the U.S. government
seized admissible.86 The court admitted the intercepted radio transmis-
sions because the defendants had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the radio communications.8 7 The court also allowed admission of the
evidence obtained in the warrantless search partly because its occurrence
on the high seas was an exigent circumstance justifying the failure to
obtain a search warrant.88
The Ninth Circuit's disposition of most of the Peterson case is sound.
The facts amply demonstrate that the DEA conducted a joint venture
with NARCOM by any standard. 9 The DEA described the operation as
a "joint investigation," and it was involved in the investigation on a daily
81. Id. at 489.
82. Id. The boat had left the Philippines and was headed toward Panama.
83. Id. at 490.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 489. The suspicious behavior of the crew on the boat justified the Coast Guard
search. Id. at 492. The court also relied on the broad statutory authority the Coast Guard has to
search vessels. Id. at 492-93. Hence, the court rejected the defendants' evidentiary challenge that the
search and seizure of the boat was tainted by the illegal wiretap and the intercepted transmissions.
87. Id. at 490. This requirement is derived from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-364 (1967). Harlan argued that the fourth amendment applies only
if the defendant had "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at 361.
This test has been adopted by a majority of the Court in later cases. See generally United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (use of"beeper" inside barrel of chemicals bought by defendant not
a violation of any expectation of privacy); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (no expecta-
tion of privacy in telephone numbers defendant dialed).
88. 812 F.2d at 494. See supra note 16. The court also held the wiretapped conversations
admissible. At the outset, the court consulted Philippine law to determine the reasonableness of the
extraterritorial search. Id. at 490. Failing to find a Philippine judicial pronouncement on the legal-
ity of a wiretap like the one involved in Peterson, the court assumed that the wiretap did violate
Philippine law, and thus was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. Nonetheless, the court
relied on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) in finding the DEA agents had relied in good
faith on the NARCOM agents' assurances that the wiretap complied with Philippine law and that
the exclusionary rule, therefore, did not apply. Id. at 492.
89. Id. at 490.
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basis.' Thus, the Peterson case is of little help in defining what consti-
tutes a joint venture.
One significant aspect of Peterson is that, despite the existence of a
joint venture, the U.S. agents apparently did not need a search warrant
from an U.S. magistrate.91 Rather, the Peterson court measured the con-
duct of the U.S. agents abroad by the law of the foreign sovereign. Thus,
under Peterson the focus shifts to the propriety of the acts under foreign
law rather than under U.S. constitutional law. The court's application of
Philippine law to determine reasonableness under the fourth amendment
is startling. The court neither cited authority for the proposition nor
even suggested a rationale for its conclusion. According to Peterson, if a
U.S. agent relies in good faith on the foreign government's representa-
tions that the joint venture complies with that country's law, he has car-
ried out his constitutional duty to refrain from unreasonable searches
and seizures. This rule, however, was apparently shortlived. In United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,92 the same court held the law of the foreign
sovereign is irrelevant to whether a fourth amendment violation
occurred.93
The Verdugo-Urquidez94 court also addressed the question of what
constitutes a joint venture. In Verdugo-Urquidez, the United States Mar-
shals Service and Mexican officials joined in a cooperative effort to appre-
hend Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a reputed drug smuggler, killer
and one of the leaders of a large Mexican criminal operation. The joint
effort led to Verdugo-Urquidez's arrest by the U.S. Marshals Service
which transported him to the United States. Once in the United States,
the DEA took custody of him.95 The DEA subsequently sought cooper-
ation from the Mexican government in a search of Verdugo-Urquidez's
Mexicali residence, which it hoped would disclose documentary evidence
and cash proceeds of narcotics transactions.96 The DEA and a team of
Mexican Federal Judicial Police (M.F.J.P.) officers also proceeded to
90. Id.
91. Id. at 492.
92 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
93, Id. at 1229. Moreover, since Peterson the Supreme Court in California v. Greenwood, 108
S. Ct. 1625, 1630-31 (1988) held that the "reasonableness" of a search does not depend on the law of
the particular state in which the search occurs. This holding seriously undermines the Peterson
approach.
94. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
95. Id. at 1215-16. The DEA had obtained an arrest warrant for Verdugo-Urquidez for viola-
tions of federal criminal laws. Id.
96, Id. at 1216-17. DEA surveillance revealed that a house in Mexicali was Verdugo-Ur-
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Verdugo-Urquidez's other Mexican residence in San Felipe. A two hour
search of the house ensued.9 Most of the M.F.J.P. officers "stood a pe-
rimeter watch" while the others, including DEA agents, conducted the
search of the house. 98 At the conclusion of the search, all of the seized
items, except weapons, were turned over to the DEA.99
The DEA agents and M.FJ.P. team then drove to Verdugo-Ur-
quidez's Mexicali residence where M.F.J.P. officers and DEA agents con-
ducted a room-by-room search of the house."c° Another DEA agent
supervised the M.F.J.P. officers' search, deciding whether the DEA
wanted the items they found.101 Having decided it was too late to con-
tinue the search, the M.F.J.P. commandante placed in a briefcase all of
the documents that the DEA officials had not yet examined,102 and in-
structed the DEA agents to take the briefcase and sort through the docu-
ments at a later time.103 The DEA agents then returned to the United
States with the seized documents. o
The Ninth Circuit held that the U.S. participation in the search was
"so great that no court could logically conclude anything other than that
the search was an American operation from start to finish."105 The court
enumerated several factors which it considered in reaching this conclu-
sion. First, the DEA planned and instigated the search for the express
purpose of securing evidence for a U.S. trial.'06 Second, the DEA was
quidez's principal residence in Mexico but that he also owned a home in San Felipe, Baja California,
Mexico. Id. at 1225.
97. Id. at 1227.
98. Id. at 1226-27.
99. Id. at 1227.
100. Id. Four DEA agents drove to the M.F.J.P. office in Mexicali where they met with the
local M.F.J.P. commandante. Id. at 1217, 1226. From there a team of between ten and fifteen
M.F.J.P. officers and the four DEA agents drove to the Mexicali residence. Id. at 1226. Before the
search team left the M.F.J.P. office, "[the commandante] told the DEA agents that they would be
permitted to take back to the United States any documentary items they found." Id. The M.F.J.P.
conducted a "security sweep" around the perimeter of the house and the DEA agents then entered
the house but did not begin their search. Id. The commandante and the DEA agents then decided
to drive to Verdugo-Urquidez's San Felipe residence because it was getting late, and the drive to San
Felipe would take two hours. Id. A few of the M.F.J.P. officers were left behind to secure the
Mexicali residence. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1228.
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involved before, during and after the searches."0 7 Third, before the
search began the M.F.J.P. told the DEA it could keep all the evidence
seized."0 8 Last, the DEA not only sought Mexican assistance in the in-
vestigation, but asked for "permission to run [its] own operation. ' 9
After concluding that U.S. participation in the search sufficiently es-
tablished a joint venture, the court considered what the fourth amend-
ment requires of U.S. agents under such circumstances.110 The Verdugo-
Urquidez majority held that Mexican law is irrelevant to the question of
whether the search violated the fourth amendment,II' implicitly overrul-
ing Peterson. First acknowledging that, in the absence of exigent circum-
stances, the fourth amendment requires U.S. officers to obtain a search
warrant before entering a residence in the United States," 2 the court
then considered whether the requirement applies to searches of homes
abroad." 3 The court conceded that "a warrant issued by an American
magistrate would be a dead letter in Mexico.""' Nevertheless, the court
held the DEA should have obtained a warrant, not for its legal value in
Mexico, but rather for its "substantial constitutional value in this coun-
try. A warrant issued by a detached magistrate here would reflect the
magistrate's determination that probable cause to search existed." 1 5
The Ninth Circuit correctly asserted that no court could fail to find a
joint venture on the facts of Verdugo-Urquidez. 16 Had the court failed
to find a joint venture in Verdugo- Urquidez, the doctrine could arguably
have been considered abandoned, at least in the Ninth Circuit. Thus,
like the Peterson decision, the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion adds little to the
definition of "joint venture." Nevertheless, the court's fourth amend-
ment analysis was significant. As Judge Wallace accurately charged in
his dissent,"I7 the majority ignored the implicit holding of Peterson that a
warrant is not required before U.S. agents may conduct an extraterrito-
107. Id.
108, Id.
109. Id. The court's fourth factor was merely a restatement of the first. "Fourth, it was the
DEA who took the initiative in ensuring the search took place soon after Verdugo-Urquidez's
arrest." Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1229.
112. Id. See also supra note 12.
113. 856 F.2d at 1229.
114, Id.
115. Id. at 1230.
116. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
117. 856 F.2d 1249.
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rial search.118 In addition, the court rejected the astounding Peterson
rule that foreign law determines the reasonableness of an extraterritorial
search and, instead, consulted U.S. law as the standard for reasonable-
ness under the fourth amendment.
The international silver platter cases demonstrate that only indisputa-
ble U.S. participation gives rise to a finding of a joint venture. Peterson
and Verdugo- Urquidez, unlike the other cases, involved actual seizures by
the United States. In Hensel, the United States gave the Canadians
armed cover to facilitate the Canadian search and seizure. However, the
Birdsell, Stonehill and Marzano opinions teach that even in operations
where there is substantial U.S. participation, the courts may still refuse
to find a joint venture. Accordingly, when U.S. agents obtain informa-
tion during an extraterritorial operation, the evidence will more likely
than not be admissible in a U.S. trial provided that U.S. agents did not
seize any of the evidence or facilitate the foreign seizure.' 19
The Stonehill, Birdsell, and Marzano decisions appear result ori-
ented, 120 with each court evidently intent upon avoiding the obvious con-
clusion that each operation was a joint venture between the United States
and a foreign government.12 ' Perhaps one explanation for the reluctance
of the courts to impose strict fourth amendment requirements on U.S.
law enforcement officials investigating abroad is the fear of impairing
necessary law enforcement practices. The fourth amendment warrant re-
118. Id. at 1229.
119. See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 140 (5th Cir. 1976) (the courts "have as a
statistical matter been virtually unanimous in rejection of undue participation"), cert. denied sub
nom., Martin v. United States, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
120. The courts are unquestionably reluctant to suppress foreign-seized evidence. For example,
the courts have never held it impermissible for U.S. officials to give tips to foreign governments,
Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967); United States v.
Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Martin v. United States, 430 U.S. 956
(1977); United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); to
convey suspicions to foreign governments, United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978); or
to supply information to foreign governments, United States v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986); United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423 (M.D.Fla. 1979).
In addition, foreign wiretaps that federal agents do not "initiate, supervise, control or direct" do
not trigger the fourth amendment. United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976). In short, the cases illustrate that courts require very "substantial par-
ticipation" by U.S. agents in foreign searches before excluding the evidence.
121. In Marzano, for instance, an FBI agent admitted to a joint U.S.-Caymanian effort. The
defense attorney asked the FBI agent at trial whether he told his office "that there was a joint
Caymanian-Bureau effort to find the defendants?" The agent responded, "I told them what informa-
tion had been developed [in the Cayman Islands] since we were there, through [the Cayman police-
man]. I kept them informed, yes." 537 F.2d at 280 n.6 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
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quirement, however, would be no greater a burden to bear for U.S.
agents abroad than for agents within the United States. All but the most
trivial U.S. participation in a foreign investigation should constitute a
joint venture triggering fourth amendment requirements. To avoid ad-
ding burdens on agents abroad, courts should exclude evidence seized in
a joint U.S.-foreign search only if the U.S. officials could have obtained a
warrant from a U.S. court yet failed to do so. 1 22 As the court in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez'23 pointed out, even though a U.S. warrant
would carry no legal authority in a foreign country, it would serve the
purpose of ensuring that probable cause existed to justify a U.S. search or
seizure."' If, however, exigent circumstances prevent officers from ob-
taining a warrant before conducting the search, then a court should ap-
ply the same exception it does for agents in the U.S.: exigent
circumstances justify a warrantless search or seizure unless the officers
acted without legally sufficient probable cause.125
In sum, if U.S. officers do not possess a facially valid search warrant,
or if they lack probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances, then
they should not participate to any significant degree in a foreign search.
This approach would infuse life into the fourth amendment as it applies
abroad, without unduly interfering with extraterritorial U.S.
investigations.
III. THE "SHOCKS THE JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE" TEST
Courts repeatedly have stated in dictum that they can suppress for-
eign-seized evidence1 26 if the circumstances surrounding the search and
seizure "shock the judicial conscience," 12 though no court has ever done
122. One option available to U.S. law enforcement officials abroad is to seek, by telephone, a
magistrate's authorization to conduct a search in a foreign country. See Berlin Democratic Club v.
Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 160 n.10 (D.D.C. 1976) (expressing approval of such a procedure). See
also United States v. Robinson, 533 F.2d 578, 588 (D.C. Cir.) (expressing approval of telephonically
issued warrants), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956 (1976). Since Robinson was decided, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure have been amended to authorize the issuance of a warrant "upon sworn oral
testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means" when "circumstances make it
reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
123. 856 F.2d 1214, 1228-30.
124. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3042 (1982) which
authorizes extraterritorial arrests and the issuance of extraterritorial arrest warrants.
125. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., United States Y. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 25 (1983); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d
120, 139 (5th Cir. 1976); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1965).
127. The language comes from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where Justice Frank-
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so. The courts justify this exclusionary rule as an exercise of their "su-
pervisory power" over the administration of criminal justice in the fed-
eral courts.' 28  Because suppressing relevant evidence is a drastic
measure,' 29 the talismanic invocation of the "supervisory power" as a
justification for excluding evidence deserves close scrutiny. This section
of the Note discusses the origin and purpose of the supervisory power
and examines the scope of the supervisory power, particularly as it re-
lates to the suppression of evidence.
A. The Origin and Purpose of the Supervisory Power
In McNabb v. United States,'30 the Supreme Court for the first time
explicitly excluded evidence on the basis of the Court's "supervisory au-
thority."'13' In McNabb the Court held inadmissible confessions that fed-
eral agents obtained in violation of a federal statute during a post-arrest
furter found that state officers violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by forc-
ing an emetic solution into the defendant's stomach to induce him to vomit narcotic capsules.
Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter stated that this intrusion does "more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This
is conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 172.
128. Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d at 782 n.10. See also United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d
1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., concurring) ("[S]everal other circuits have previously stated
that we should use our supervisory power to suppress evidence of a foreign search by means which
"shock the conscience.").
129. In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), Justice Powell, for the majority, wrote:
The Court has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case. Our cases
have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to
enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding
functions of judge and jury.
Id. at 734. (citations omitted).
The fact that no court has ever excluded evidence seized by a foreign government underscores the
fact that the courts consider exclusion a draconian penalty. Only alleged foreign conduct of an ex-
tremely outrageous nature would come within the "shocks the conscience" rule. See United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir.) (only case where a court has held alleged foreign conduct to
shock the conscience), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974) (en banc).
130. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
131. Id. at 341. For a general discussion of the supervisory power see Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433 (1984). Prior to McNabb, in Funk v. United States, 290
U.S. 372 (1933), the Court had asserted its authority to modify the common law rules of evidence, in
effect creating a federal common law of evidence. The Erie doctrine does not prohibit federal courts
from developing a federal common law in cases where no state law governs. Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, eg., Delcostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462
U.S. 151, 159-61 n.13 (1983) (Erie cannot "be taken as establishing a mandatory rule that we apply
state law in federal interstices."). Erie applies only to those cases which are governed by state law.
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detention. 13 2 The statute required prompt presentation of an arrestee
before a U.S. commissioner. 133 The Court reasoned that to allow the
convictions to stand would "[make] the courts themselves accomplices in
wilful disobedience of the law. Congress has not explicitly forbidden the
use of evidence so procured. But to permit such evidence to be made the
basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which
Congress has enacted into law." 134 Thus, mere congressional failure to
forbid the use of such evidence prompted the Court to create a new rule
of evidence. Resting its decision on neither constitutional nor statutory
grounds,1 35 the Court proclaimed that "U]udicial supervision of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence."1 36
Since McNabb, the Supreme Court has invoked the supervisory power
P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 857-63 (3d ed. 1988).
With the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the scope of the court's authority to modify the
rules of evidence is less clear, though undoubtedly more narrow. Beale, supra note 131, at 1483-90.
132. 318 U.S. at 341-42.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c) (1985). The 1940 version com-
manded federal officers to take any arrested person "before the nearest United States commissioner
or the nearest judicial officer ... for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial ... 
134. 318 U.S. at 345.
135. Despite the Court's discussion of congressional policy, it did not find a statutory intent that
such evidence be excluded. Id. at 346. Cf Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 339 (1939)
(finding an implicit congressional intent that courts exclude evidence procured through wiretaps in
violation of § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103).
136. 318 U.S. at 340. Since 1793, federal courts sitting in equity had statutory authority to
"make rules and orders for their respective courts directing the returning of writs and processes, the
filing of declarations and other pleadings ...." The Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 333,
335. Since 1792, the Supreme Court has had authority to prescribe rules of equity; actions at law
were governed by state law, subject to modification by either the Supreme Court or the lower federal
courts. The Act of May 8, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. The Court first exercised its power when it
prescribed thirty-three Equity Rules (7 Wheat. xvii).
In 1934, along with the power to prescribe rules of procedure for actions in equity and at law,
Congress empowered the Court to merge law and equity. The Act of June 19, 1934, § 2, 48 Stat.
1064. Four years later, the Court promulgated rules of procedure to merge law and equity. Sup. Ct.
R. 1-86, 308 U.S. 645-766 (1938). In addition, a series of enactments beginning with the Act of
February 24, 1933, 47 Stat. 904, and culminating with the Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 688, gave
the Court broad power to promulgate rules of criminal procedure.
The Court first submitted Rules of Evidence to Congress in 1972. See 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that rules of evidence were not within the Court's delegated au-
thority. Id. at 185. When Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, (88 Stat. 1926
(1975)), it simultaneously enacted a new "Enabling Act" to govern the promulgation and amend-
ment of the Rules of Evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2076. (1982).
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on several occasions to create new rules of evidence.' 37 Congress has
modified or overruled several of these supervisory power decisions. 31
Notwithstanding the uncertainty respecting the contours of the Supreme
Court's supervisory power, the lower federal courts have invoked a su-
pervisory power of their own, apparently with the Supreme Court's ap-
proval.139  Assuming, however, that federal courts do have broad
supervisory power to create rules of procedure 4 ° and remedies for viola-
tions of federal law, 41 there remains the issue of the courts' authority to
establish new rules of evidence.
B. The Use of the Supervisory Power to Exclude Evidence
Congress delegated to the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate
rules of evidence through a formal rulemaking procedure. 142  Unlike
137. See, ag., Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 3, 14 (1956) ("The decision herein passes
only on the integrity of a criminal trial in the federal courts.... [It is the Court's duty] to see that
the waters of justice are not polluted."); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956) (invoking the supervisory power in "fastidious regard for the honor of the
administration of justice"); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956) (a case raising "not a
constitutional question but one concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement
agencies").
138. Congress modified the McNabb-Mallory rule, which requires the suppression of confessions
unless there had been a prompt arraignment, so that if a confession is voluntary and made within six
hours of arrest, a court cannot exclude it solely because of a delay in taking a defendant before a
magistrate. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1985). Similarly, following Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957), Congress adopted the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a),(e) (1982), which provides that the
government need not disclose a government witness' statements until the witness has testified on
direct examination at trial. The Act also defined which statements of government witnesses the
prosecution must disclose to the defense. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a),(e) (1982).
139. See, eg., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506-07 (1983) ("[R]eversals of convictions
under the [appellate] court's supervisory power must be approached 'with some caution' "); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n. 7 (1980) ("Federal courts may use their supervisory power in
some circumstances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by 'willful disobedience of
law.' "). See also Beale, supra note 131, at 1455-62.
140. The phrase "rules of procedure" as used in this Note refers to only those rules regulating
"technical details and policies intrinsic to the litigation process, not the regulation of primary behav-
ior and policies extrinsic to the litigation process." Beale, supra note 131, at 1465. This Note will
treat rules of procedure and rules of evidence separately.
141. See, eg., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390-97 (1971) (recognizing a federal common law cause of action for federal violations of the
fourth amendment).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1982). Section 2072, enabling the Court to prescribe rules of procedure,
and § 2076, enabling the Court to prescribe rules of evidence, both provide that no changes shall go
into effect until 90 days after they have been reported to Congress (180 days for rules of evidence).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2076. Some question exists, however, concerning the Court's authority to bypass
these procedures and make rules through adjudication. See Beale, supra note 131, at 1482-83.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/8
19891 U.S. PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN SEARCHES
rules of procedure, which all federal courts have authority to prescribe
absent a controlling statute or rule,143 Federal Rule of Evidence 4021"
effectively divests the lower courts of authority to create a federal com-
mon law of evidence. 145 McNabb recognized the Court's power to for-
mulate rules of evidence only in "areas not governed by statute." '146
Thus, the courts' invocation of a supervisory power to create a new ex-
clusionary rule of evidence is almost certainly misplaced and without
authority. 147
The Supreme Court addressed the propriety of the lower courts' use of
the supervisory power to exclude evidence in United States v. Payner.141
In Payner, Justice Powell explained that the primary purpose for exclud-
ing evidence under the exclusionary rule or the supervisory power is de-
terrence of unconstitutional law enforcement.149 Two years later, in
United States v. Hasting,50 the Court noted that the purposes of the
courts' supervisory power are threefold: to remedy violations of recog-
nized rights, to preserve the integrity of the courts "by ensuring that a
conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury,"
and to deter illegal law enforcement conduct.15'
The Court cited McNabb ' 2 and Rea v. United States153 in support of
("IThe Court's statutorily granted authority extends only to legislative rulemaking, not to the an-
nouncement of general rules in the course of adjudication.").
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982).
144. FED. R. EviD. 402. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." Id.
145. Beale, supra note 131, at 1487-90. Rule 402 may provide for the formulation of exclusion-
ary rules as remedies for violations of the Constitution and violations of federal statutes by the
language "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, [or] by Act of
Congress ......
146, 318 U.S. at 341 n.6.
147. However, invocation of the supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained by U.S. officers
through unconstitutional means is probably not precluded by Rule 402 and may even be authorized
by its caveat that "evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution ... 
148. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
149. Id. at 736-37. Justice Powell wrote:
The values assigned to the competing interests do not change because a court has elected to
analyze the questions [of exclusion] under the supervisory power instead of the Fourth
Amendment. In either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the detrimental
impact of excluding evidence remain precisely the same.
Id.
150. 461 U.S. 499 (1982).
151. Id. at 505.
152, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
153. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
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the assertion that one of the purposes of the supervisory power is to rem-
edy violations of recognized rights. 54 As noted previously, McNabb in-
volved an illegal, post-arrest detention, 155 while in Rea, the Court
prevented a state court from using evidence which a federal agent ille-
gally seized. 56 Notably, both cases involved the remedying of violations
of federal law.'57 Similarly, the cases which support the proposition that
a court may invoke its supervisory powers to preserve judicial integrity
involved violations of federal law.'5 ' The third purpose of the supervi-
sory power, to deter illegal law enforcement conduct, explicitly contem-
plates some violation of law.159 Hence, regardless of the purpose a court
cites for invoking its supervisory powers to exclude evidence, Hasting
suggests there must be an underlying violation of the law. Moreover,
excluding evidence solely on the basis of a court's notion of fundamental
fairness would be a violation of Rule 402,160 could raise questions of
separation of powers 6' and would not fulfill any of the three Hasting
purposes.
In the international silver platter cases, the courts lack any authority
to prescribe a "shocks the conscience" rule of evidence. 162 Rule 402 ex-
pressly limits the courts' authority to declare relevant evidence inadmis-
sible unless specifically provided by the Constitution, statute or rule.
163
154. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505.
155. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
156. More particularly, the Court ordered the agent to "reacquire the evidence and destroy it or
transfer it to other agents." 350 U.S. at 216. In addition, the Court enjoined him from testifying in
the state proceedings. Id. The decision in Rea, asserting a supervisory power "over federal law
enforcement agencies," implicates a potentially serious separation of powers problem. See Beale,
supra note 131, at 1506-10; Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1657 (1963).
157. McNabb involved a federal officer's violation of a federal statute, 418 U.S. at 342; Rea
involved a violation of Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 350 U.S. at 214-15.
158. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (involving a fourth amendment
violation).
159. The Court cited Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), which involved a fourth amendment viola-
tion. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505.
160. See supra note 144.
161. Judicial formulation of exclusionary rules of evidence on the basis of a court's notion of
fundamental fairness would be tantamount to judicial supervision of law enforcement agencies. See
supra note 156.
162. See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text. Judge Bork, concurring in United States v.
Mount, 757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985) objected to the oft-repeated dictum recognizing a supervi-
sory power to exclude foreign-seized evidence. Id. at 1320-24.
163. See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
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Neither the Constitution, 1"I federal statute, Federal Rules of Evidence
nor any rule promulgated by the Supreme Court makes evidence pro-
cured by foreign governments inadmissible under any circumstances.' 65
Rule 402, therefore, prohibits the courts from suppressing any relevant
evidence, even if it is seized by a foreign government in a manner that
"'shocks the conscience."
IV. CONCLUSION
Occasional U.S. involvement in foreign searches and seizures has be-
come a necessity of international law enforcement. The courts have re-
fused to exclude evidence seized by foreign governments in searches
which fail to meet fourth amendment requirements, unless U.S. officers
significantly participated in the search and seizure or the foreign govern-
ment's conduct "shocks the judicial conscience." Courts have inter-
preted both rules of exclusion narrowly. This Note argues that the
federal courts, without acknowledgment, are applying the fourth amend-
ment only when the United States actually seizes evidence during a for-
eign search or when U.S. conduct makes the foreign seizure possible. As
an alternative to the "joint venture" standard which has proved to be
only a nominal limit upon U.S. agents abroad, this Note proposes that
even minimal U.S. participation in a foreign search should trigger the
fourth amendment, particularly its warrant requirement.
This Note also challenges the validity of the "shocks the judicial con-
science" formula for the exclusion of foreign-seized evidence. The lower
federal courts lack authority to exclude evidence merely because the
method of its procurement "shocks the conscience." Until the Congress
or the Supreme Court grants such authority to the courts, foreign-seized
evidence should be excluded only if U.S. agents participate in the search
and, absent exigent circumstances, fail to obtain a warrant from a U.S.
magistrate. By following this rule the courts will both protect the fourth
164. The Constitution does not require the exclusion of evidence procured by foreign govern-
ments, even where the seizure was effectuated by means that "shock the conscience." The Court, in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), required the exclusion of evidence seized by shocking
means because the state officer's shocking conduct was deemed to violate the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Because the fourteenth amendment applies only to the states, and the
fifth amendment applies only to the federal government, neither the fourteenth nor fifth amendments
apply where the shocking conduct is purely foreign.
165. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 455 (1976) (the exclusionary rule does not apply to
foreign governments).
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amendment rights of U.S. citizens abroad and insure United States par-
ticipation in international law enforcement.
Robert L. King
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